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WILL  THE  initiation of  active macroeconomic  stabilization  policies 
change  the behavior  of the private  sector?  If so, what  will these changes 
be? And what are their implications  for the design and effectiveness  of 
stabilization  policy? 
I will use two ways of searching  for answers  to these questions.  The 
first  is empirical.  It involves  looking  at recent  history  and  trying  to discern 
relevant  signs or patterns.  The aim is to describe  how the private  sector 
has responded  to cyclical fluctuations  and how these responses have 
changed  over time. 
The second approach  is analytical.  It explores  consequences  for the 
design  and effectiveness  of policy that stem  from  the assumption  that  pri- 
vate economic agents anticipate countercyclical  policy actions. Why 
should  this  be a helpful  exercise?  After  all, as many  have suggested  and  as 
the empirical  section  of this  paper  generally  shows,  no clear-cut  rules  can 
describe  postwar  macroeconomic  policy. Nor is it clear that all private 
economic  agents  make  unbiased  predictions  of economic  variables  and  in- 
corporate  expectations  about  policy actions  into their  predictions.  Never- 
theless,  an answer  to the "what  if" question  is helpful.  If the effectiveness 
of policy actions  depends  upon  the ability  of policymakers  to surprise  the 
private  sector,  there  is a legitimate  worry  about  a decline  in the impact  of 
policy with its repeated  use. If, on the other hand, the effectiveness  of 
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policy is enhanced  by rational  anticipatory  behavior  in the private  sector, 
this worry  is groundless  and there  is even a case for the dissemination  of 
information  about  the aims  and  design  of stabilization  policy. 
Whether  people anticipate  policy and whether  this matters  are widely 
debated  questions  at present.'  The underlying  issue  is whether  the sum  of 
individual  actions serves to maximize  welfare  in the absence  of coordi- 
nating  actions  from a central  authority.  If the only cause of the business 
cycle is surprise  events and if the private  economy  can itself act quickly 
to restore  full-employment  equilibrium  following  any initial shock, then 
policy  actions  are  probably  at best unnecessary  and  at worst  undesirable.2 
In such a context,  it is natural  to think  of the private  sector  acting  to min- 
imize the impact  of policy, to counteract  its intent, just as most people 
minimize  their  liability  for income  taxes. 
Post-Keynesian  models often cite random  shocks as the initiators  of 
the business  cycle, but stress  the inability  of the private  economy  to re- 
store  full employment  in the short  run.  In this context  it is more  natural  to 
think of the private  sector  welcoming  the impact  of policy3  and perhaps 
even reinforcing  its effects.  Since the view of the business  cycle taken  in 
this paper is in the post-Keynesian  tradition,  its conclusions,  not sur- 
prisingly,  differ  from  those  of models  with  more  classical  assumptions. 
The rationality  of expectations  is the aspect  of recent  classical  models 
that has received the most attention.  But other assumptions  are more 
crucial  to the findings  about  policy, and they are much  harder  to accept. 
1. Robert E. Lucas, Jr., "Econometric  Policy Evaluation: A Critique,"  in Karl 
Brunner and  Allan  H.  Meltzer, eds.,  The  Phillips  Curve and Labor Markets, 
Carnegie-Rochester  Conference Series on Public Policy, vol. 1 (Amsterdam: North- 
Holland,  1976),  pp.  19-46;  Thomas J. Sargent, "A Classical Macroeconometric 
Model for the United States,"  Journal of Political Economy, vol. 84 (April 1976), 
pp. 207-37; William Fellner, Towards  a Reconstruction  of Macroeconomics (Amer- 
ican Enterprise  Institute, 1976); Edmund S. Phelps and John B. Taylor, "Stabilizing 
Powers of Monetary  Policy under Rational Expectations,"  Journal  of Political Econ- 
omy, vol. 85 (February 1977), pp. 163-90; Stanley Fischer, "Long-Term  Contracts, 
Rational Expectations, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule," Journal of Political 
Economy, ibid., pp. 191-205; Franco Modigliani, "The Monetarist Controversy  or, 
Should We Forsake Stabilization Policies?" American Economic Review, vol. 67 
(March 1977), pp. 1-19; Ray C. Fair, "A Criticism  of One Class of Macroeconomic 
Models with Rational Expectations"  (August 1977; processed). 
2. For this result to hold it must also be true that any systematic  serial correlation 
of random  shocks be correctly  anticipated  and allowed for. 
3. This point is made by Arthur M. Okun, "Fiscal-Monetary  Activism: Some 
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In particular,  flexibility  of prices  is required  in order  that equilibrium  be 
restored  quickly  after some disturbance.  To the extent  that stickiness  of 
prices or wages is caused by illusion or arbitrariness,  rational  expecta- 
tions should  rule  it out.  However,  recent  theories  of price  and  wage  setting 
and long-standing  theories of imperfect  markets  have provided  at least 
the beginnings  of a reconciliation  of rationality  and stickiness.  The per- 
sistence  of price  and  wage inflation  through  recessionary  periods  is a fact 
to which  theory  must  adapt. 
The plan  of the paper  is as follows.  First,  there  is a brief  comparison  of 
the periods  before  and after  World  War  II that suggests  that  the initiation 
of policy  has made  a difference,  even if the Great  Depression  is excluded. 
The emphasis  then shifts to the postwar  period,  when, according  to the 
argument  here, important  changes  have occurred  both in policy and in 
people's perception  of it. Econometric  evidence is then presented  that 
looks consistent  with the hypothesis  that these changes  in the policy en- 
vironment  have induced  changes  in private  behavior. 
The empirical  evidence  may  be suggestive  but  it is not conclusive.  Some 
analytical  issues of the impact  of anticipated  policy are explored  with a 
simple  theoretical  model. 
The Climate  of Greater  Stability 
The  Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation  is a remarkable  institution. 
Prior  to its existence  bank  failures  and  runs  on banks  were  very  common. 
Since  it came  into being  it has rarely  had  to pay out. Other  things  have  not 
been equal, of course,  but the fact that deposits  are insured  changes  the 
behavior  of depositors  in a way that  induces  greater  stability  in the bank- 
ing system.  Fears of a run on the bank can become self-fulfilling  as de- 
positors  scramble  to withdraw  funds. Even if an individual  knows for a 
fact that a bank is basically  sound,  he is not being  irrational  to hurry  to 
the teller's  window  for his money  once the rush  starts. 
The analogy  to the existence  of stabilization  policy is not exact,  but it 
has some  validity.  If everyone  believes  that  major  depression  and  runaway 
inflation  can be controlled,  these events become less likely. A recession 
will not induce  the same  panicky  cutbacks  in investment  or employment; 
an inflation  will not induce the same flight from money and financial 
assets. 
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tion policy attempts  to go beyond this-to  smooth output  fluctuations. 
The more stable the economic  environment  the fewer the economic  re- 
sources that have to be devoted to contingency  planning,  to adjusting 
schedules, and to designing  for flexibility.  For example, a production 
process  that  may be the least-cost  one when  operations  are  near  capacity 
may be a very high-cost  one when capacity  is underutilized.  Greater  sta- 
bility of demand  then permits  the use of the least-cost  process.  Further- 
more, when private individuals  are risk averse, stabilization  yields a 
tremendous  gain. If the overall  economic  environment  can be made less 
uncertain,  a general  gain in welfare  will result. 
Is there  any  sign  that  stabilization  policy  has actually  produced  greater 
stability?  The Employment  Act of 1946 marked  an important  turning 
point. It expressed  the political  will to avoid  recession  or depression,  and 
the Keynesian  revolution  in macroeconomic  theory  held that  stabilization 
policy could be the instrument  of that  will. Figure  1 simply  plots the rate 
of growth  of real gross national  product  for the period 1901-76 while 
table 1 gives some means  and standard  deviations  for the GNP gap, un- 
employment,  and inflation.  The broad  outlines  of the story are familiar. 
But the change in the amplitude  of cyclical fluctuations  is surprisingly 
dramatic.  The impact  of the 1946 act is not seen immediately,  but from 
about 1948 on the change  is clear  from figure  1. The figure  also reveals 
that  the magnitude  of the swings  in the Great  Depression  were  not so un- 
usual as one might  have thought.  It is the sequence  of three successive 
sharp  downturns  that  marks  off  this  period.  Serious  instability  is evidenced 
even as late as 1946 itself, when the abrupt  reduction  in war-related  ex- 
penditure  resulted  in a 12  percent  decline  in real  GNP. 
Table 1 shows  that  the standard  deviation  of GNP around  its trend  and 
the standard  deviation  of the unemployment  rate are both higher  in all 
early  periods  than  they  were  in all later  ones. The differences  are statisti- 
cally significant  under  the assumption  (admittedly  rather  dangerous)  that 
each annual  observation  is an independent  random  drawing.4  Some  of the 
difference  may  be attributable  to greater  errors  in the data  for the earlier 
periods,  but the general  picture  is the same even without  relying  on such 
data.  For example,  Schumpeter  gives  evidence  of sharp  booms  and  slumps 
4. Tests were performed  on whether  the variances  of the GNP-gap variable across 
periods were significantly  different  from each other. The variances for 1920-41 and 
1900-45 were significantly  greater than all the postwar variances at the 1 percent 
level. The  variance for  1900-16  and 1920-29  was significantly greater than the 
1948-61 variance at the 5 percent  level, the remainder  at the 1 percent  level. 16  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1978 
Table 1. Variability  of GNP, the Rate of Unemployment,  and  the Rate of Inflation, 
Selected  Periods  before  and  after 1946 
Unemployment  rate  Inflation  rateb 
GNP  gap,a 
standard  Standard  Standard 
Period  deviation  Mean  deviation  Mean  deviation 
Before  1946 
1900-16, 1920-29  6.21  4.95  2.23  1.06  4.56 
1920-41  12.99  11.52  7.59  -0.57  5.74 
1900-45  13.58  7.77  6.51  1.86  6.11 
After 1946 
1948-61  3.38  4.79  1.29  2.14  2.68 
1962-73  2.46  4.74  0.88  3.37  1.84 
1966-76  2.26  5.25  1.66  5.54  2.56 
1946-76  3.56  4.95  1.34  3.84  3.60 
Sources: U.S.  Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, 
pt.  1 (Government Printing Office, 1975), series F3, D9,  D87,  E135; Economic Report of  the Presidelt, 
January  1977, pp. 188, 221, 242; Survey of Current  Business, vol. 57 (July 1977), p. S-8 and table 1.2. 
a.  The GNP gap is defined as (GNP  -  trend GNP)/trend  GNP, where trend GNP is computed from 
fitting a logarithmic time trend to GNP over the specific subperiod. Values are for real GNP. 
b. The inflation rate is measured by the consumer price index. 
going  back all through  the nineteenth  century.5  These  swings  appeared  to 
last for several  years  and  were not perceived  as uncorrelated  movements 
around  a full-employment  equilibrium. 
The rate  of inflation,  as measured  by the consumer  price  index,  has also 
varied  less in the  postwar  period.  But  the average  rate  of inflation  has  been 
higher, especially in the years 1966-76.  Price stability  has not been 
achieved. 
Table 1 and  figure  1 give only crude  evidence.  But for what  it is worth, 
it is consistent  with the view that  the Keynesian  revolution  taught  us how 
to stabilize  the real  variables  of output  and  unemployment,  but  not how to 
combine low and stable unemployment  with price stability.  The same 
figures  present  a challenge  to anyone  trying  to make  the case that  policy 
can and should control  the price  level, but has no influence  on real vari- 
ables.6 
It is important  to make  a full accounting  of the changes  that  took place 
5. Joseph A. Schumpeter,  Business  Cycles:  A Theoretical,  Historical,  and Statisti- 
cal Analysis of the Capitalist  Process, vols. 1 and 2 (McGraw-Hill, 1939). 
6.  Note also that despite the declining importance of self-employment and the 
presence of  unemployment insurance, minimum wages, and the baby boom, the 
average unemployment rate is the same for 1946-76 as it was in the nonwar, non- 
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in the way economic  policy is made.  Before  World  War  II it was thought 
that raising  taxes to balance  the budget  in a recession  and allowing  "un- 
sound"  banks to fail were both neutral  or laissez-faire  policies. Under- 
standing  how to avoid destabilizing  the economy and enacting social 
programs  that automatically  stabilized  it were both at least as important 
as was learning how to use discretionary  policy.7 
Several  previous  writers  have recognized  the greater  stability  of the 
postwar  period,  and  some  have  gone  on to suggest  that  not only  has  policy 
changed  the path of real output,  but also private  behavior  has been af- 
fected. Specifically,  a confidence  effect  has been suggested.  For example, 
William  Nordhaus  has argued  that  a decline  in the  rate  of return  on capital 
is consistent  with a decline  in the risk premium  for capital  investments.8 
In a detailed  examination  of the financial  behavior  of corporations,  Hy- 
man Minsky  found that shifts  in the portfolio  and leverage  positions  of 
corporations  in the postwar  period  reflect  a belief that depression  condi- 
tions  will not recur.  He concludes  this because  many  corporations  would 
be vulnerable  to bankruptcy  if faced  by a new  depression.9 
An important  question,  examined  further  below, is the extent  to which 
the hypothesized  confidence  effect has come about directly. Perhaps 
people  understand  fully the principles  of policymaking  and  predict  how it 
will  be used,  or, alternatively,  they  may  have  little  understanding  of policy, 
but simply  find  that  the economy  is more  stable  and  change  their  behavior 
as a result. These alternatives  have very different  implications  in some 
situations.'0 
Finally,  two qualifications  are in order.  First, the postwar  period  has 
not been uniformly  stable.  The erosion  of confidence  during  1973-75 and 
7. In particular,  the argument  that the stability after World War II has resulted 
in part simply from the large size of the government sector, while not wrong, is 
surely deceptive. For example, the government can simply purchase an army when 
it needs it and send it home when it does not; but doing so without any offsetting  ac- 
tion will cause a problem-witness  1946. A  large but volatile government sector 
may be worse than a small government  sector. 
8. William D. Nordhaus, "The  Falling Share  of Profits,"  BPEA, 1:1974, pp. 169- 
208. 
9.  Hyman P. Minsky, "Private  Sector Asset Management  and the Effectiveness  of 
Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice,"  Journal of Finance, vol. 24 (May 1969), 
pp. 223-38. 
10. For example, Edmund S.  Phelps' idea of  using policy announcements to 
have a direct impact on inflation depends upon the direct link between policy and 
behavior. See "Disinflation  without Recession: Adaptive Guideposts and Monetary 
Policy" (Columbia University, October 1977; processed). 18  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1978 
other  changes  are  discussed  extensively  in the following  analysis.  Second, 
cyclical  instability  is by no means  the only form  of serious  uncertainty  for 
firms;  shifts  in comparative  advantage  are  another.  The  point  remains  that 
one  major  source  of instability  has  been  ameliorated. 
Policy  and  Perception  of Policy  after  World  War  II 
A brief discussion  of the changing  policy environment  and the chang- 
ing perceptions  of policy since World  War II may shed a little light on 
whether  policy has a direct  effect on behavior  or only an indirect  effect, 
through  its impact on demand  and output.  It will also provide  a back- 
ground  against  which  the econometric  evidence  of the next section  can  be 
interpreted.  The econometric  evidence  will not compare  the prewar  and 
postwar  periods.  The data for the prewar  period are weak, and, in any 
case, the postwar  years  provide  sufficient  variability  both in policymaking 
and in perceptions  of policy. The evidence,  therefore,  looks for changes 
within the latter  period.  Consider  now the changing  perceptions of policy, 
provided  primarily  by a review  of the business  press."l  Three  phases  will 
be distinguished.  The first  is from 1948 until the beginning  of the sixties 
(leaving  aside  the immediate  postwar  years); the second  from  the begin- 
ning of the sixties  through  1971; the third  since 1971. 
During  the first  phase policymakers  had committed  themselves  to an 
attempt  to mitigate  the effects  of the business  cycle,  but they  were  not en- 
tirely  confident  of whether  or how this could  be done. Policy actions  were 
viewed  mainly  as leaning  against  the wind  rather  than  giving  full control 
over the cycle.  Moreover,  there  were  important  constraints  on policy: the 
Federal  Reserve  felt an obligation  to maintain  stability  in the  bond  market 
and to assist the financing  of federal debt; and fiscal policy, then even 
more than now, was heavily constrained  by the desire to balance the 
budget. 
Even as early as 1946, the business  community  showed  considerable 
awareness  of the aims  of stabilization  policy and  the mechanisms  by which 
it might  work. In 1946, Business Week discussed  in detail the Employ- 
ment Act and the formation  of the Council  of Economic  Advisers.  On 
11. Two  Yale  undergraduates,  John Friedman and Kathy Sheehan, surveyed 
Business Week and the Commercial and Financial Chronicle for me. Their reports 
were supplemented  by some reviewing  of my own. Martin  Neil Baily  19 
Keynes'  death,  reviews  of his theories  cited them as demonstrations  that 
man had learned  to control  his economic  destiny.  However,  the general 
tone throughout  this  period  was very  cautious,  especially  in the  more  con- 
servative  publications.  There  was great  fear of budget  deficits,  a mistrust 
of government  intervention  of any  kind, a fear of letting  inflation  get out 
of hand, and a general  skepticism  about  whether  policy really could do 
anything  to help smooth the cycle. The independence  of the Federal 
Reserve  was viewed  as extremely  desirable,  largely  because  its governors 
were trusted  to resist the inflationary  printing  press more than was the 
Treasury,  which was viewed as too political. 
The second  phase of the postwar  period  covered  the activist  and gen- 
erally expansionist  policies followed during  the 1960s. In its March  17, 
1962, issue,  Business Week commented:  "John  F. Kennedy  is beginning 
to show  what  kind  of President  he intends  to be....  He will be a President 
who intervenes  overtly and systematically  in areas  of the U.S. economy 
that, in theory at least, always operated  on their own....  All modem 
Presidents  have  intervened  in the economy  to some  extent.  The distinctive 
thing about the Kennedy  brand of intervention  is that it has been ac- 
cepted  as a conscious  and consistent  policy."  The rapid  growth  with low 
inflation  in the mid-1960s  was to a considerable  extent attributed  to the 
activist  policy measures.  Even the skeptics,  who had been given to fre- 
quent complaints  about the "Keynesian  nonsense,"  began to speak  of a 
consensus  concerning  the benefits  of using  fiscal  and monetary  policies  to 
control  the economy.12 
The third  phase,  beginning  in 1971, is the hardest  one to characterize. 
Clearly,  there  has been a change  in the climate  since the 1960s in terms 
of both policymaking  itself and  the reactions  to it. Policymakers  have  dis- 
played  much  more  concern  with  inflation,  and  the confidence  of business- 
men in the desirability  of policy has waned. But expectations  have not 
returned  to what they were in the old days. In the 1970s, there  remains 
a view  that  the path  of the economy  is governed  by an interaction  between 
the endogenous  economy  and  policy actions,  and  that  policy has tremen- 
12. This was true, for example, of the normally skeptical editorials in the Com- 
mercial and Financial Chronicle. Herbert Stein commented on the consensus within 
the economics profession for a fiscal stimulus: "If [Kennedy]  had chosen six Amer- 
ican economists at random the odds were high that he would have obtained five with 
the ideas on fiscal policy which his advisers actually had, because those ideas were 
shared by almost all economists in 1960." See The Fiscal Revolution in America 
(University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 380. 20  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1978 
dous importance.  "The fundamental  cause of recession  and high unem- 
ployment  is not ...  history,  but inflation.  Inflation  can cause  recession  in 
two basic ways. The first (and most common) has to do with government 
actions,  while  the second  ...  [is that]  if inflation  is virulent  enough,  it will 
cause recession  directly,  by draining  purchasing  power enough  to retard 
consumption  significantly."'13 
The current  decade  is a complex  time for policymaking,  and a simple 
story will not suffice  to explain it. The main theme has been the fight 
against  inflation,  by mild recession,  by controls,  and finally  by tolerating 
a very  high level of unemployment.  The business  press  reveals  an almost 
obsessive  concern  with predicting  policy. Nevertheless,  they made some 
wrong  guesses.  When sales began to fall in 1973-74, the business  com- 
munity  did not quite believe policymakers  would sit on their  hands  and 
allow a deep recession.  Once it became  clear that they would, however, 
the consensus  developed  (correctly)  that  the recovery  would  be slow.  The 
fear of inflation  would (and did) restrain  any  powerful  measures  toward 
stimulus. 
The most persistent  irrationality  observed  concerns  the budget  deficit. 
Since  no serious  school of economic  thought  argues  a direct  link  between 
inflation  and the deficit,  it is hard  to understand  why this myth  persists.'4 
Any review  of this kind is necessarily  subjective.  But the division  into 
three reasonably  distinct  phases seems justified.  The forties and fifties 
were a period  of learning  about  what  policy can do-for  both the private 
sector and the policymakers.  During  the sixties  people had considerable 
confidence  in stabilization  policy and a belief that  it was a major  factor  in 
determining  output.  Policy shifted  emphasis  in the seventies,  and a good 
deal of enthusiasm  was lost, but it was still seen as a major  factor  in de- 
termining  output. 
Throughout  the period there has been tremendous  interest  in under- 
standing  and  predicting  policy, as evidenced  by the business  press.  By the 
1970s this interest  was at a very high level indeed. However,  exposure 
does not imply  understanding.  The business  sector  may  or may  not be able 
13. Irwin L. Kellner, "Quarterly  Business Conditions  Analysis,"  Business Report 
(Manufacturers  Hanover Trust, June 1977). (Emphasis  added.) 
14. Periods of  high budget deficits are sometimes also periods of high money 
growth, it is true. However, the myth of a direct nfiuience,  eyen of deficits financed 
without money creation,  is very strong, Martin  Neil Baily  21 
to predict  policy  actions  very  well and  it may  or may  not understand  policy 
implications  very  well.  It is certainly  trying  hard  to do both. 
The basic facts underlying  the evolution of expectations  described 
above  have already  been given. With  the experience  of 1901-46 behind 
them,  few firms  could  have  been expected  to believe  immediately  that  the 
postwar cycles would be so different. It took experience to demonstrate 
the change.  Even if policy had been applied  in a perfectly  uniform  way 
from 1948 to 1976 and  even  if this  had  resulted  in a path  for the economy 
that looked much the same throughout  the period, a shift in private  be- 
havior  would still have been expected,  at least between,  say, the period 
1948-61 and  later  years. 
Of course,  in practice,  policy has not been at all uniform  and  figure  1 
supports  the breakdown  into three  phases.  The swings  in the fifties  were 
perceptibly  sharper  than any in the remarkably  stable sixties. The two 
successive  sharp  declines  of 1974 and 1975 stand  out in the third  phase. 
I realize that some will feel that a link is missing  in this discussion. 
Nothing  has been said about  the growth  rate of the money  supply  or the 
tax cut of 1964 or other  fiscal  policy. I have commented  on the aims of 
policy, on what people thought  about  policy, and I have looked at what 
happened  to GNP and unemployment.  Linking  policy goals, policy ac- 
tions, and actual economic  events is a major  task, properly  the task of 
another  paper.  Indeed,  it has been the task  of several  papers. 
The work of George  Perry  is particularly  relevant.'5  Perry  shows  that 
policy was generally  acting  to restrain  growth  in the quarters  leading  up 
to a peak  and  acting  to stimulate  growth  in the quarters  following  a trough. 
This is consistent  with the aim of damping  down output  swings  in both 
directions.  However,  fiscal  policy was expansionary  going  up to the peak 
of 1953:2 and contractionary  around  the trough  of 1954:2, which  is in 
particular  contrast  to its stimulative  effect  after  subsequent  troughs.  This 
finding  is consistent  with the view that fiscal  policy was not yet on track 
in the mid-fifties. 
The observation  that  policy  in general,  or monetary  policy  in particular, 
has caused  postwar  recessions  does not necessarily  conflict  with the hy- 
15. George L. Perry, "Stabilization  Policy and Inflation," in Henry Owen and 
Charles L. Schultze, eds., Setting National Priorities: The Next Ten Years (Brook- 
ings Institution, 1976), pp. 271-321,  especially tables 7-1 and 7-4. Other references 
are given in that paper. 22  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1978 
pothesis  of this  paper.  One  would  expect  to see evidence  of concern  about 
inflationary  pressure,  especially  on the part  of the  Federal  Reserve. 
This section  presents  some evidence  suggesting  that  a given  fluctuation 
in output  or sales has induced  different  responses  in three  important  de- 
cision variables  of firms-employment, inventories,  and investment- 
depending  upon  the  postwar  phase  in which  it occurred. 
Changing  Responses  to the Cycle 
Two points should  be stressed  from the start.  First, although  in most 
cases the estimated  equations  are based upon past work  in fitting  equa- 
tions,  the aim  is not at all to pick the best econometric  equation  and  then 
test for shifting  parameters.  The best-fitting  econometric  equations  will 
often include explicit  expectational  variables,  like surveys  of sales fore- 
casts,  or implicit  proxies,  like the stock  market,  that  contain  expectational 
information.  If the mechanism  by which expectations  are formed has 
changed,  then the change  is wholly or partly  caught  in these variables. 
One of the purposes  of the evidence  presented  here is to test whether 
cyclical  fluctuations,  often output  changes,  have continued  to induce  the 
same  responses  in employment  or investment  or other  variables  over the 
postwar  period. 
Second, if hard evidence on expectations  were available,  one could 
test for changes  in the relationship  between  expectations  and the cycle. 
Unfortunately,  it is not. Instead, the more direct approach  described 
above  is taken, and it cannot  rule out the possibility  that "other  factors" 
may have caused shifts in responsiveness.  Hence, no claim is made that 
the evidence given here proves that private economic behavior has 
changed  as a result  of policymaking.  But this limitation  is always  true  of 
econometric  evidence: significant  coefficients  do not prove causality.  In 
the equations  given below, however, the range of other interpretations 
may be wider  than usual. At most, I will claim that there  may be traces 
of milk on the cat's  whiskers. 
What  signs  of the changes  in the expectational  environment  would  be 
expected? If policy has smoothed cyclical fluctuations,  increased the 
probability  of a return  to full employment,  and reduced  the probability 
of extreme  outcomes,  firms  will view a given short-run  change  in output 
as less likely to persist  or intensify.  The adjustment  of employment  and 
investment  to short-run  movements  in output  will, therefore,  be less com- Martin Neil Baily  23 
plete. Firms  will be more  willing  to take a long view.  Despite  a downturn, 
they will continue  to invest; and they will tend more to hold onto their 
workers.  Similarly,  they will react less to upturns.  Output  changes  will 
still have an impact,  but it will become  less pronounced. 
THE  RESPONSE  OF  EMPLOYMENT 
When an individual  firm  is struck  by a downturn  or an upturn  in de- 
mand, the way it reacts depends  importantly  on whether  the change  is 
expected  to continue,  intensify,  or be reversed  in the near  future.  The  firm 
can react with some combination  of three actions: laying off or hiring 
workers,  varying  hours  of work  per worker,  and  increasing  or decreasing 
inventories.  Each element  of the decision  costs something.  Hiring,  firing, 
and training  costs are incurred  directly  by firms when employment  is 
varied.  Income  uncertainty  and the disutility  of overtime  are costs faced 
by workers  when either employment  or hours are varied.  They become 
costs for the firm  to the extent that firms  must compensate  workers  for 
them  with  higher  base  wage  rates  or overtime  premiums. 
Holding inventories  allows a gap between  production  and sales, but 
at the cost of interest  expenses  and storage  charges.  Firms  may also hold 
excess  labor  rather  than  piling  up unsold  inventories.  This labor  hoarding 
may take the form of payment  for more hours than employees  actually 
provide  or of requiring  less intense  effort  from employees  during  down- 
turns. 
Table 2 shows how the relationship  between  production  and employ- 
ment has shifted  in the postwar  period.  The logarithm  of employment  is 
regressed  on a time trend  and  the logarithm  of current  and lagged  values 
of output.  The data used are quarterly  for the private  nonfarm  economy 
and the equations  are run over various  periods  between  1948 and 1976. 
The response  of employment  to output  is strikingly  different  during  the 
period 1948-61 than  it is in later  periods.  The size of the response  is dif- 
ferent  and,  to a lesser  extent,  so is the speed.  Statistical  tests  reveal  that  the 
relationship  between  employment  and output  has shifted  significantly."' 
In the 1948-61 period,  the estimates  indicate,  a sustained  fall in output 
equal to a 5 percent  rate induced  a 2.42 percent  decline  in employment 
in the same quarter  and a 5.35 percent  decline after five quarters.  The 
parameters  for the 1962-71 period  indicate  that  the same  decline  in out- 
16. The hypothesis that the parameters  remain the same over either 1948-71 or 
1948-76 is rejected  decisively at the 1 percent  level in both cases. fX 
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put induced  only a 1.05 percent  decline  in employment  in the same  quar- 
ter. After  five  quarters  the drop  is only 3.50 percent. 
The equation  estimated  over 1948-61 shows employment  changes  in 
proportion  to output, allowing  for a year to adjust;  over that interval, 
there  is even a slight  trace of decreasing  returns  to labor.  The coefficient 
on time indicates  a productivity  trend  of about  21/2  percent  a year.  Most 
of the adjustment  of employment  occurs in the current  and the next 
quarter.  The same equation estimated  after 1961 looks very different. 
Both the long-run  elasticity  and the productivity  trend  are much  smaller 
and the constant  is larger. 
These  results,  therefore,  support  the hypothesis  of less complete  adjust- 
ment to short-run  changes  in output  after 1962. If firms  begin  to extrap- 
olate output  forward  using  a trend  growth  rate-that is, if they  take a long 
view-the  apparent  productivity  time trend  will tend to drop.  Again the 
results  support  this view. 
Using  the private  nonfarm  economy  seemed  the most  natural  approach. 
It could  be argued,  however,  that  the decline  in the fraction  of production 
and nonsupervisory  workers  in the sector (from 87.9 percent  in 1948 to 
82.6 percent  in 1974), along  with changes  in the sectoral  mix of employ- 
ment,  could  be causing  the  results  shown.  To check  this  view  the  equations 
of table  2 were  run  for production  workers  in manufacturing.  The results, 
shown in table 3, generally  support  the previous  findings.  The drop in 
long-run  output elasticity  after 1961, though not quite so sharp,  is still 
pronounced,  and still statistically  significant.'7  Since monthly data are 
available they are used, although quarterly  versions of the equations 
looked  very  much  the same.-8  Collinearity  among  the thirteen  output  vari- 
ables  produced  a scattering  of negative  signs  in the coefficients  and these 
make  a mean-lag  calculation  dubious.  Instead,  the percent  of the long-run 
output  effect  occurring  in the current  month  is shown  and a sharp  shift  in 
timing  is evident.'9 
Although  hypotheses  other than those invoking  expectational  effects 
17. The null hypothesis that the parameters remained the same from 1949 to 
1975 was rejected  at the 1 percent  level. 
18. The long-run elasticities were very close. The quarterly  estimates masked  the 
shift in timing away from the current  month revealed  in table 3. 
19. It was suggested  to me that the rapid Korean War buildup might be respon- 
sible for the 1948-61 findings  and that a dummy  variable  for 1950:3 to 1951:2 might 
alter the results. It did not do so, however, and the dummy entered with opposite 
signs in the regressions  of tables 2 and 3. A~~~~~~~~~ 
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could explain  these results, certain  structural  changes  might have been 
expected  to work  in the opposite  direction.  First, self-employed  workers 
will reduce  their hours of work when business  is slack rather  than lay 
themselves  off, and self-employment  has declined.  Second,  both my own 
models  and  those  developed  by Martin  Feldstein  suggest  that  the  increased 
coverage and generosity  of unemployment  insurance  over the period 
probably  encouraged  layoffs.20 
It was noted earlier  that the seventies  marked  a shift  in policy toward 
fighting  inflation.  In 1975 people expected  an extended  recession.  Tables 
2 and 3, particularly  the latter,  reveal  a more complete  response  of em- 
ployment to output in the regressions  for the most recent period. Of 
course,  the 1973-75 period  was a very  unusual  one, and  it would  be dan- 
gerous  to infer  too much  from  the  regression  that  includes  it. 
THE  RESPONSE  OF  INVENTORIES 
An efficient  firm  compares  the costs of varying  employment  with the 
cost of using  inventories  to adjust  the gap between  sales and production 
in the short  run.  If firms  in recent  periods  are  varying  employment  less in 
response  to a given output  variation  compared  with earlier  years, as the 
preceding  section suggested,  then they are changing  behavior  at the em- 
ployment-output  margin, and consistent change at the inventory-sales 
margin  can be expected. 
Furthermore,  any change  since 1948 in the relation  between  a distrib- 
uted lag of past sales and firms'  expectations  of future  sales also should 
show  up. Specifically,  a short-run  increase  in sales  will raise  expected  sales 
by a smaller  amount  after 1961. Similarly,  a fall in sales will lower ex- 
pected  sales  by less. 
To examine  these  hypotheses  an equation  relating  business  inventories 
to final  sales was run  over the same  subperiods.21  Table 4, which  reports 
20.  Martin Neil Baily, "On the Theory of Layoffs and Unemployment,"  Econo- 
metrica, vol. 45 (July 1977), pp. 1043-63; Martin  Feldstein, "Temporary  Layoffs in 
the Theory of  Unemployment," Journal of  Political Economy, vol.  84  (October 
1976),  pp. 937-57.  Some empirical evidence on this question is given in Martin 
Feldstein, "The Effect of  Unemployment Insurance on Temporary Layoff Unem- 
ployment," discussion paper 520  (Harvard University, Harvard Institute of  Eco- 
nomic Research,  November 1976; processed). 
21.  A log-linear form was used because it seemed to be a natural extension of 
the demand for labor and for fixed capital. Besides, it fit much better. A linear speci- 
fication showed similar changes in coefficients,  however. The main difference  is that 
the linear specification  has a much lower long-run  elasticity. 4i  m  00 
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the results,  shows  substantial  differences  between  the 1948-61 period  and 
the later  periods.  The differences  are  highly  significant  statistically.22  The 
most  important  changes  are  that  the  lagged  dependent  variable  has a much 
larger  coefficient  and the sum of the coefficients  on sales is much  smaller 
in the later  periods.  In addition,  the current-sales  variable  changes  sign. 
Table 4 is intended  to provide  only a descriptive  statement  about  the 
changing  dynamics  of inventories  of final  goods. It does not use data on 
sales forecasts  because, as noted earlier,  this would eliminate  part  or all 
that is of interest here. It does not compare  models based on sales- 
forecasting  errors  with models  based  on target  adjustment.23 
The descriptive  picture  does  look consistent  with  the changes  described 
above.  The increase  in the ratio  of the coefficient  of the lagged  dependent 
variable  to the sum of the coefficients  of the sales variables  is consistent 
with firms'  taking a longer view when incorporating  information  about 
current  and  past sales  into an expected  sales estimate.  The change  of sign 
of the coefficient  of current  sales is consistent  both with this notion that 
current  sales get a smaller  weight  in the estimate  of future  sales and  with 
the notion  that  a high (low) level of sales,  whether  or not  it was  predicted, 
is met  to a greater  extent  by selling  out of inventories  (allowing  inventories 
to build  up) in the later  periods. 
THE  RESPONSE  OF  ORDERS  FOR  PRODUCERS'  DURABLES 
The accelerated  response  of investment  to changes  in output  has been 
seen as a major  determinant  of the business  cycle and as a potentially  im- 
portant  source  of dynamic  instability  in the economy.  The specification  of 
the accelerator  in econometric  work  usually  assumes  that  firms  try  to gear 
their  investment  demand  to changes  in a desired  capital  stock,  which  de- 
pends,  in turn,  on the paths  of output  and  capital  costs.  If firms  adjust  less 
rapidly  or completely  to short-run  changes  in output  and  capital  cost, the 
accelerator  parameters  will change. 
A difficulty  with simply  testing  directly  for changes  in the accelerator 
22.  Null hypotheses that the parameters have remained constant from 1948 to 
1971 or from 1948 to 1976 were both rejected  at the 1 percent  level. 
23.  Michael C. Lovell, "Sales Anticipations, Planned Inventory Investment,  and 
Realizations,"  in Robert Ferber, ed., Determinants  of Investment  Behavior (Colum- 
bia University Press for the National Bureau  of Economic Research, 1967), pp. 537- 
80; Martin Feldstein and Alan Auerbach, "Inventory  Behavior in Durable-Goods 
Manufacturing:  The Target-Adjustment  Model," BPEA, 2:1976, pp. 351-96. 30  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity, 1:1978 
is that expectational  lags and delivery  lags are hopelessly  intertwined  in 
the specification  of  investment-expenditure  equations.24  Using orders 
rather  than expenditures  helps to solve the problem,  but only partially 
because  changes  in delivery  lags will in general  imply changes  in the ex- 
pectation  structure.  Still,  the response  of orders  to changes  in output  (and 
cost) is certainly  closer to what is wanted.  The MPS model contains  an 
orders  equation  and this was estimated  over various  subperiods,  with the 
results  shown  in table  5.25  Data  limitations  prevented  the estimation  of the 
equation  prior  to 1953:2, thereby  missing  several  of the early  and more 
volatile  years.  Further,  the service-price  variable  does incorporate  expec- 
tational  information  from  the stock  market.  Both of these  factors  bias the 
findings  against  structural  change.  Nevertheless,  the smoothing  or damp- 
ening  of the accelerator  response  over  time  is quite  marked,  and  the timing 
of the  response  is also different.  It is noticeably  slower  in the  later  periods. 
Very  little acceleration  occurred  in the period  1962-71, which  was domi- 
nated  by the steady  growth  from 1962 to 1966. With  the 1972-76 period 
included,  the accelerator  makes  a comeback,  but  only a modest  one. 
Despite  the marked  differences  in the point  estimates  of the  parameters, 
statistical  tests do not uncover  significant  shifts  in the function.26  Beyond 
the two factors  given  earlier,  the main  reason  is that  the likelihood  func- 
tion is rather  flat with respect to the parameters  even over the whole 
period,  as the  write-up  of the  MPS  model  notes.27 
The Stock  Market,  Interest  Rates,  and  Inflation 
An additional  piece of econometric  evidence,  of a different  type,  is also 
consistent  with  the hypothesis  of changing  expectations. 
24.  See Robert E. Hall, "Investment,  Interest Rates, and the Effects of Stabiliza- 
tion Policies," BPEA, 1:1977, pp. 61-103. Evidence from the backlog of past orders 
suggests  that delivery  lags have probably  changed  over time. 
25. The data were supplied by the staff at the Federal Reserve Board. There is 
one difference between the equation as run here and the MPS version: first-order 
serial correlation is allowed for because the equation seems to require it; the esti- 
mated p is large and significant. The changes across periods become much more 
pronounced  if serial correlation  is ignored. 
26. If the MPS procedure is followed and serial correlation is ignored, then the 
shifts are significant. 
27.  "Quarterly  Econometric Model" (MIT-Penn-SSRC,  May 1977, preliminary; 
processed). Martin Neil Baily  31 
Table  5. Estimates  of the Effects  of a Sustained  Change  in Output  or Service  Price on 
Orders  for Producers'  Durable  Equipment  over the Subsequent  Eight Quarters, 
Selected  Periods,  1953:2-1976:  4a 
1953:2-1961:4  1962:1-1971:4  1962:1-1976:4  1966:1-1976:4 
Type  of 
effect  and  Service  Service  Service  Service 
quarter Output price  Output price  Output price  Output  price 
Effect  in each  quarter  as percent  of long-run  or steady-state  effectb 
0  288  0  58  0  141  0  133  0 
1  340  122  108  60  198  42  193  48 
2  350  191  138  98  234  72  230  80 
3  327  219  150  119  249  91  246  99 
4  282  215  150  126  246  101  243  109 
5  226  190  140  124  228  105  224  111 
6  170  156  126  116  196  105  192  108 
7  125  122  112  107  153  102  150  104 
8  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Total long- 
run effect,, 
E  (bi +  ci)  0.0170  0.0193  0.0188  0.0192 
Autocorre- 
lation co- 
efficient,  p  0.701  0.718  0.653  0.616 
Source: MPS data bank. 
a.  Derived from the equation 
OPD  =  0.01  [  bi  VPD_'_iXB_i  2  ci  VPD_iXB_; 
i _  b VPi-X  -  1  jVD~B 
where OPD is new orders for producers' durable equipment, VPD is the equilibrium ratio of  producers' 
durables  to output multiplied by a constant, and XB is gross private domestic business product. OPD and 
XB are measured in 1972 dollars. 
b. The long-run effect of a step change in the product (XB)(VPD) is given by  (bi  +  ci). The percent of 
this long-run effect in each quarter is given in the table. For further discussion see Charles W. Bischoff, 
"The Effect of Alternative Lag Distributions," in Gary Fromm, ed., Tax Incentives  and Capital Spending 
(Brookings Institution, 1971), pp. 61-125, especially table 3-11 and the accompanying discussion. 
Investors  in the stock market  seem to be very concerned  with antici- 
pating  policy. The market  appears  to fluctuate  quite  sharply  upon  rumors 
of changes  in policy or even changes  in personnel.  In order  to pick up 
signs of the changing  awareness  of policy and the changing  emphasis  of 
policy  itself,  the pattern  of correlation  among  four  variables  is considered. 
These are (1)  Standard  and Poor's index of 500 stocks; (2)  the inter- 
est rate on new issues of high-grade  corporate  bonds (this variable  also 
is a proxy  for bond prices); (3) the consumer  price  index;  and (4)  cor- 
porate profits.  All four variables  were expressed  as quarter-to-quarter 
proportional  rates of change.  The rate of change  of the stock index was 32  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1978 
Table 6. Correlations  among  the Stock Index,  Interest  Rates, Prices, and  Corporate 
Profits,  Selected  Periods,  1948:1-1976:4a 
Independent  variable 
Interest  Consumer  Corporate 
Equation  andperiod  Constant  rate  price index  profits  R2 
6-1  1948:1-1961:4  0.0288  0.0182  -0.0224  ...  0.0005 
(3.7)  (0.2)  (-0.0) 
6-2  1948:1-1961:4  0.0267  -0.0526  0.212  0.181  0.0995 
(3.6)  (-0.5)  (0.3)  (2.4) 
6-3  1962:1-1976:4  0.0446  -0.342  -2.95  ...  0.2446 
(3.4)  (-2.3)  (-3.0) 
6-4  1962:1-1976:4  0.0432  -0.347  -2.90  0.0406  0.2465 
(3.3)  (-2.3)  (-2.9)  (0.4) 
6-5  1966:1-1976:4  0.0648  -0.390  -3.97  ...  0.3390 
(3.4)  (-2.6)  (-3.1) 
6-6  1966:1-1976:4  0.0637  -0.394  -3.93  0.0394  0.3409 
(3.2)  (-2.5)  (-3.0)  (0.3) 
Source: Business Conditions  Digest, various issues. 
a.  All  variables are expressed as quarter-to-quarter  proportional changes. The dependent variable is 
Standard and Poor's 500-stock index. The interest-rate variable is the rate on new issues of  high-grade 
corporate bonds. The numbers in parentheses are t  statistics. The consumer price index and corporate 
profits are seasonally adjusted. 
used as the dependent  variable  and the other rates of change are inde- 
pendent variables,  although  no assertion  about causality  is made. The 
results,  given in table 6, trace a fairly clear pattern.  Neither  the interest 
rate nor the CPI is correlated  with the stock  market  in 1948-61. Corpo- 
rate  profits  is the only statistically  significant  variable,  showing  a positive 
correlation.  The periods 1962-76 and 1966-76 show very different  re- 
sults. The shift in the parameters  between these periods and 1948-61 
is statistically  significant.  The corporate-profits  variable  totally  loses sig- 
nificance  while  the  interest-rate  and  CPI  variables  acquire  large  significant 
coefficients. 
These findings  are consistent  with the following  analysis.  Substitution 
between  bonds and stocks  in portfolios  always  suggests  that a rise in the 
interest  rate  will depress  stock  prices  ceteris  paribus.  In the period  1948- 
61 a business expansion  simultaneously  (1)  raised interest  rates, (2) 
raised  corporate  profits,  and (3)  raised  profits  expectations.  The combi- 
nation  of the second and third  factors  explains  the significant  coefficient 
on profits.  The interest-rate  coefficient  remained  negative  but small  as the 
positive  correlation  between  stock prices  and the interest  rate  implied  by Martin Neil Baily  33 
equation  6-1 almost  offsets  the portfolio-substitution  effect.  After 1962, 
and  especially  after  1966 when  the  fight  against  inflation  was  so important, 
a general  business  expansion  and rise in profits  no longer  generated  the 
expectation  of more of the same.  The decline  of the profits  coefficient  re- 
flects this development.  The interest-rate  coefficient  becomes  large and 
significant,  reflecting  both the predominance  of the portfolio-substitution 
effect  and the fact that rising  interest  rates signal contractionary  policy. 
Similarly,  in the later periods, again especially  in 1966-76, the strong 
negative coefficient  on the inflation  variable  is consistent  with stock- 
market  fears  that  inflation  will lead  to future  contractionary  policies.28 
I tried  a couple of variations  on table 6. The interest  rate  on Treasury 
bills  performed  in much  the same  way as the rate  on new corporate  issues. 
The lagged  value of the inflation  variable  entered  with the opposite  sign 
to the current  inflation  rate, indicating  that any acceleration  of inflation 
as well as the level might  be important.  But the coefficients  were insig- 
nificant. 
Anticipated  and Unanticipated  Policy:  Some  Analytical  Issues 
In this section a simple  illustrative  model is developed  in which  fiscal 
policy is used to offset  fluctuations  in the level of real aggregate  demand. 
For the present  it is assumed  that fluctuations  in aggregate  demand  are 
simply  met by corresponding  variations  in the level of output  supplied. 
I assume  that firms  have rational  expectations  about  the behavior  of the 
economy when they make investment  decisions;  they may or may not 
anticipate  the offsetting  policy actions,  and I contrast  the two cases. The 
approach  used considers  the consequences  of anticipating  policy, while 
rejecting  the assumption  of complete  price  flexibility.  I begin  in this sec- 
tion with the extremely  simplified  assumptions  of no price  flexibility  and 
no interest-rate  responsiveness;  the next section  suggests  how the results 
obtained  here must be modified  when prices and interest  rates also re- 
spond. A discrete-time  framework  is used with unsubscripted  variables 
referring  to time t and pluses and minuses  referring  to periods earlier 
or later  than  t (x+,  is the value  of x in period  t +  1, for example). Aggre- 
28. The generally weak performance  of the stock market in the last ten years has 
coincided with higher average rates of inflation. One might link both events to other 
causes. But the regression  is on quarter-to-quarter  changes, not on levels. 34  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1978 
gate demand  has its usual components:  investment,  consumption,  and 
government  demand. 
Investment  demand  in period t depends  upon adjustment  to a desired 
capital  stock,  kdea.  With  x4 1  the expected  level of real  output  in t +  1 and  v 
the desired  capital-output  ratio, 
(1)  k+1=  vx;,. 
A one-period  delivery-installation  lag for investment  goods is assumed, 
and  investment  demand  (i) is then specified  by 
(2)  i=  vx,-(1-  )k, 
where  8 is the  depreciation  rate  and  k is the actual  stock  of capital  in period 
t. More  realistically,  one could assume  that  delivery  might  be spread  over 
more  than one period  and  that  firms  would  worry  about  being  stuck  with 
excess  capital. Such  considerations  would  modify  the results  derived  here, 
but  would  not change  their  basic  character. 
Government  demand  is set by policy and  is denoted  by g. Poll taxes  are 
raised  to finance  this expenditure  in an amount p, and the budget  is as- 
sumed  always  to be balanced: 
(3)  g=4,. 
Gross output (x)  less taxes paid (+)  constitutes  income available  to 
the household  sector (y): 
(4)  y  =  x-  =  x-g. 
Consumption  demand  is based upon y*, the long-run  equilibrium  value 
of income (discussed  further  below) and  y, current  income:29 
(5)  c =  #1[Xy*  +  1-  X)y] + E,  0 <  X <  1. 
If X  1, the specification  says  that  consumers  save a constant  fraction  of 
their  permanent  income;  if X  <  1, consumption  is influenced  by transitory 
income. The term E is transitory  consumption,  the source of random 
29.  The specification  of 5 involves a minor simplification  because it does not start 
with permanent income defined as the present discounted value of expected future 
income. If  instead of  5,  consumption were made proportional to  ye, defined by 
( 1-X)  E  Xy+,  the model's main conclusion would carry through.  The algebra  in- 
volved in the backward  recursion  to be used below becomes much more burdensome, 
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shocks  in the system  from,  for example,  distributional  effects  or variations 
in consumer  sentiment.  It will be assumed  further  that e is positively 
serially  correlated-that is, that a positive or negative  disturbance  may 
persist  over time. 
(6)  e  = p6-1  +T  O <  p  <l, 
where  v is serially  uncorrelated  with  mean  zero. 
Let x* be the target  or desired  level of output  and assume  this target 
level is stationary  over  time.  In the absence  of any  random  shock (E =  0) 
this target  level of output  can be achieved  by a level of government  ex- 
penditure  (g*) given  by 
(7)  g*  X*  1-  v 
where  0 < g* < x* provided  /3 + Sv <  1. Such  an equilibrium  solution  is 
characterized  by (1)  a stationary  capital  stock, k* = vx*; (2)  gross in- 
vestment equal to  Sk* (net investment  zero); and (3)  gross saving 
( 1-  /)y*  =  (1 -p)  (x* -g*)  also equal to Sk* (net saving  zero)  . 
The condition  p +  Sv <  1 is the condition  that the marginal  propensity 
to consume (MPC) out of long-run  gross income (output less taxes) 
and the marginal  propensity  to invest  out of GNP sum  to less than  unity. 
Without  this there  is no "room"  for government  expenditure.30 
THE  RESPONSE  OF  THE  ECONOMY  TO RANDOM  SHOCKS: 
NO  POLICY 
Consider  a situation  in which  the economy  has been in equilibrium  at 
x = x* with no shocks  impinging  on the system.  What  is the response  of 
the economy  to a shock  in period  t, e  0&  O,  in the absence  of any  policy  ac- 
tion-that  is, when g* prevails  in all periods?  The absence  of any policy 
action  is a fact known  to all persons  in the economy  so that 
(8)  g9+  = ge8  = g*,  s > O. 
The shock E  has a direct  impact  on aggregate  demand  in period  t and, 
30. In a more complete model, either a change in the interest rate that altered v 
(and perhaps ,B) or an unbalanced government budget would provide more flexi- 
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therefore,  on output  in t. But it also has two indirect  impacts.  The first  is 
the usual consumption  response  occurring  through  63(1  -  X), the MPC 
out of current  income.  The second  is through  investment.  Investment  de- 
mand  in t depends  upon  the expected  level of output  in period  t + 1, which 
in turn  depends  upon the level of investment  in period  t +  1. Investment 
in t +  1 depends  upon  expected  output  in t + 2, and  so on. Thus,  without 
some  way of tying  the process  down,  one can chase  a rainbow  indefinitely 
in an attempt  to evaluate  the rational  expected  path  of output  and  invest- 
ment. 
Even  with  rational  expectations  an unstable  response  is not impossible. 
The usual rationale  for ruling  out unstable  trajectories  is that they must 
hit either  a floor or a ceiling  in finite  time. Then if people anticipate  the 
floor or ceiling,  the unstable  trajectory  was not rational.  I will invoke  this 
argument  here  and assume  that there  are stable  expectations  in the sense 
that  X4 -->  x* as T ->  c.  This is a strong  assumption  to make;  it requires 
not just short-run  rationality  but long-run  foresight. 
The method of using stability  to solve out for the expected  path of 
output  is as follows.  Assume  that  for  some  large  T,  x41  =  x* and  4+  0. 
This permits  writing  down expected  output in period  T, given  by 
(9)  X4 =  13[Xx*  +  (1 -  X)XTj  +  (1 -  3)g* +  4T +  VX*  -  v(1 -  6)X. 
This can be simplified  to 
(10)  XT  =  b  I 
1 (T  +  -bX*  -+  -4  -  (10)  ~  ~~~~=  a  a  T  a 
where  a  1  +  v(l  -  6)  -  3(1  -  X) and b  (1 -  3)g*  +  3Xx*.  With  this 
endpoint determined it is possible to solve backward for xT1,  x  _2,  and 
so on, and then use a limit process to let T ->  co. This is easy enough to do, 
and the details  are given  in the appendix.  It yields  the result 
b  p8E  8E  (11)  ~~x+  =  +  ~  I8  *  +  p8 
(8  a)-a  v  +  a-pv  a-pv 
for the expected  level of output  for period  t +  s, s periods  into the future. 
In particular,  x+l is given  by 
(12)  e  +  pe 
Now  taavuoa  -  pve 
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backward  recursion  can be completed  and the value of current  output 
found.  The  variable  x is given  by 
(13)  x =  [Xy*+(1  -  )y? +  e + vx1-  (1 -  6)vx*  +  g* 
-x*+  aE 
[1 -  (1-  X)(a  -  pv)' 
where  equation  12 has  been substituted  into 13. 
Equations  11, 12, and 13 give the initial  response  and  expected  output 
path of this simple  economy  following  the aggregate-demand  shock.  The 
interpretation  of 13 is that the demand  shock  e is modified  by an expres- 
sion that  is the product  of two terms.  The first  term  is 1/[1  -  (1 -A)  ], 
where  p (1 -  X) is the MPC out of current  income.  Thus  the first  term  is 
the familiar  multiplier  expression.  The second term is a/(a  -  pv). If 
p = 0, this term  is unity.  If the random  shock  e is serially  uncorrelated,  it 
causes  no change  in investment  demand.  The size of the capital  stock in 
period  t is not what  would  have been chosen  had the shock ebeen antici- 
pated,  but the desired  capital  stock for t +  1 is unaltered-given p = 0. 
The interesting  case  for the model  is one in which  0  < p <  1. The  sec- 
ond term is then strictly greater than unity and the investment response 
amplifies the impact of the demand shock in combination with the simple 
multiplier. 
The result  just stated  turns  out to be the most important  to the com- 
parison  of anticipated  and  unanticipated  policy.  But a complete  compari- 
son of the two cases also depends  upon whether  or not the investment 
response  amplified  the lingering  effects  of the initial  shock;  these  lingering 
effects  are  expected  to be pE,  p2E,  and  so on in successive  periods. 
The deviation  of x+8  from  x* is just  p8e multiplied  by the expression 
(a  -  pv)-'  =  [1 +  v(l  -  a  -  p) -(1- 
If investment  were fixed in this model, this expression  would reduce  to 
the multiplier-only  case [1 -  3(1  -  X)]-1.  Thus whether  the investment 
response  amplifies  or diminishes  the deviation  of x+,8  from  x* depends  on 
whether  p is greater  or less than (1 -  5). Formally, 
(14)  a  <5  (I  -).  a - pv  1--3(-  X)  as  5- 
The  case  p < (1 -  6) seems  much  the most  likely  one so I will call it the 
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a positive  shock (e >  0) unequivocally  raises  investment  (i >  i*). How- 
ever, in the normal  case, the opposite  is true for expected  investment  in 
future  periods.  A positive  shock e >  0 leads to i+8  < i* for s >  0. Thus 
making investment  endogenous  implies that expected  output is a little 
closer  to its long-run  equilibrium  value  than  would  be true  in a multiplier- 
only model. Deviations  of i+8  from i* somewhat  offset  the deviations  of 
consumption  from its long-run  value.3' 
What  explains  the fact  that  a positive  (negative)  shock  in period  t results 
in lower (higher)  future  investment?  The reason  is simply  that although 
expected  output is always greater  than x* following  a positive demand 
shock,  it is neverthelessfalling  over  time.  If x+8  < x+8,_,  then i%  < i* even 
though  x+8  >  x*. This is just a usual  accelerator  response.  Finally,  why  is 
the condition  p  <  (1 -  6)  necessary  to all this? The preceding  story is 
always  true for net investment.  Net investment  is zero in equilibrium.  A 
positive  demand  shock  induces  positive  net investment  in the same  period; 
the capital  stock  is increased  to match  the higher  expected  level of output 
in future  periods.  Net investment  is then negative  in future  periods;  the 
capital  stock is adjusted  back  to its equilibrium  level as output  converges 
to x*. If the rate of depreciation  were very  rapid  and the demand  shock 
were expected  to persist-that is, if p >  (1 -  8)-then gross investment 
would  be increased  in all periods  by a positive  demand  shock.  The  negative 
net investment  would be offset by the larger replacement  investment 
required  by the larger  capital  stock. 
UNANTICIPATED  FISCAL  POLICY 
It will now be assumed  that government  expenditure  is varied  in re- 
sponse to the demand  shock in an attempt  to restore  the target  level of 
output  x*.32 Policy  actions  are  not anticipated,  however,  so that  it remains 
true  that 
(15)  g+8  =  g*  s  >  0. 
Consider,  as before,  a situation  in which  the economy  has been operat- 
ing in equilibrium  and is then  hit by an unanticipated  shock  E.  This  shock 
is a surprise  to the policymakers,  so that government  expenditure  in 
31. In fact 1/ (a -  pv) could be less than unity. This would require ,B (1 -) 
<v(l  -  p -  8).  The term (a -  pv) is always positive, so that there is no question of 
a positive shock now causing  expectations  of a recession. 
3  2. The budget  remains  balanced,  however;  g = 9 in all periods. Martin  Neil Baily  39 
period  t has  already  been  set at g*. Because  of 15  it follows  that  the private 
sector's  expectations  of output, x+", x+2, and so on, are given,  just as 
before,  by equation  11. The response  of investment,  therefore,  is already 
worked  out for  the  unanticipated  policy  case.  The  response  of the  economy 
in period  t to the initial  shock is again given  by equation  13. 
Although  the policymakers  do not know the actual value of the dis- 
turbance e+1, they do  know  its  expected value pe. They can, therefore, 
estimate  the fiscal policy necessary  in period t +  1 to restore  expected 
equilibrium.  If g+r is the level of government  expenditure  required  to 
restore  equilibrium  (to make the true expectation  of x+1 equal x*) when 
the policy is unanticipated,  then 
(16)  gfl=g*  a -  pv 
The deviation  of gr, from  g* is just equal  (and opposite)  to the deviation 
of x+l from x* from  equation  12, because  the balanced-budget  multiplier 
relevant  for unanticipated  policy  is unity.33 
ANTICIPATED  FISCAL  POLICY 
In this case, government  expenditure  is set in periods  t + 1, t +  2, and 
so on in such a way that the expected  level of output  in these periods  is 
always  x*, and investment  decisions  are made with this knowledge.  The 
initial  shock e is not offset  by policy  because  it was a surprise,  but the im- 
pact of E on investment  in t resulted  not directly from  the initial  shock,  but 
indirectly  because  of the expected  lingering  impact  of the shock (pE,  p2E, 
and so on). If these expected  effects  are offset,  then there  is no response 
of investment  to the demand  shock  c. Thus output  x, in this case, is given 
by 
(17)  x  =  x  +  XX+[113(1  -X)1 
33. The balanced-budget  multiplier is a partial concept in this context. Suppose 
policymakers ask themselves in some period, what would happen to output if we 
made an unexpected change in g that was not expected to persist? They would 
answer  this from 
x =,  3[Xy*  +  (1-X)(x-g)]  +g+vx*. 
This gives 
dx = p (1-X)  (dx-dg)  + dg, or dx/dg-1. 
Equation 7 gives the long-run  sustainable  relation  between  x* and g* with the impact 
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The magnitude  of the change  in fiscal  policy needed  for expected  equi- 
librium  in period  t +  1 also reflects  the fact that  investors  now anticipate 
policy: 
(18)  gf+  =  _  1  -  ,____  A) 
where  g_ajlt  is the level of government  expenditure  required  when  policy  is 
anticipated. 
The anticipated-policy  case is very  much  like a multiplier-only  model 
with constant  investment.  Investment  remains  constant  at i*, not because 
it is arbitrarily  fixed,  but because  expected  output  is always  equal to x8. 
COMPARISON  OF  ANTICIPATED  AND  UNANTICIPATED  CASES 
The first and most important  difference  between  the cases of antici- 
pated  and  unanticipated  policy is that  the initial  response  of the economy 
to an unexpected  demand  shock is unequivocally  smaller  when  policy is 
anticipated.  Just  thinking  about  stabilization  policy can make  people feel 
better  about  the economy.  The model,  therefore,  provides  illustrative  sup- 
port for the confidence  effect,  or "FDIC  effect,"  noted earlier. 
It is often argued  that  lags  impede  the efforts  of fiscal  policy  to stabilize 
the economy.  It takes  time  to make  even  incremental  changes  in taxes  and 
expenditures.34  This analysis  has shown  that anticipated  fiscal  policy can 
have a desirable  impact  even before it has been enacted. This is not to say 
that  the lag is a good thing;  it is not. But it may  not be quite  such a prob- 
lem as has  been suggested. 
When  the policy  is enacted  in period  t +  1, is more  or less of it required 
as a result  of its being  anticipated?  Most of the work  to answer  this ques- 
tion has been done already.  Comparing  equations  16 and 18, and using 
14, gives 
(19)  -gant  g*1  I  agin  -  g*1  as  p <  (1  -  I  ) 
The normal  case described  earlier,  where p < (1 -8),  requires  that the 
change  in policy  be larger  when  that  policy  is anticipated.  The reason  goes 
back to the earlier  discussion  of the response  of investment.  When  policy 
34. This was incorporated  in the analysis because when the disturbance  e strikes, 
investors are able to respond in the same period by altering investment  demand (if 
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is anticipated,  investment  demand  is unaffected  by the disturbance  e. The 
model behaves  like a multiplier-only  model. The main consequence  is 
that stability  is improved  in the period  when  e strikes-as noted above- 
but another  is that the offsetting  effect  from  the adjustment  of the capital 
stock  back  to its long-run  equilibrium  level is lost. Any smoothing  of the 
accelerator  makes  investment  fall less sharply  in a recession,  but also  pick 
up less  in the  recovery. 
REDUCED-FORM  OR  STRUCTURAL  INFORMATION 
In the analysis  of anticipated  policy,  firms  formed  rational  expectations 
of the  policy  change;  in fact,  they  knew  what  level of government  expendi- 
ture would be set. The conclusions  do not depend,  however,  on the as- 
sumption  that  firms  understand  the structure  of the model.  In the analysis 
of the model without  policy, they could have learned  the appropriate  re- 
sponse  to a shock E,  so that the path of output  given in equations  11 and 
13 need  not  imply  structural  information.  When  policy  is introduced,  firms 
may simply learn by experience  that an initial disturbance  of a given 
magnitude  no longer  induces  the same  path  of output.  They  may  attribute 
this to a change  in the pattern  of serial  correlation  of the disturbance,  or 
they  may  not even  be concerned  about  the  underlying  structure.35 
In order to set policy correctly,  an understanding  of the structure  is 
almost essential.  Reduced  forms of past behavior  can give a misleading 
guide to policy, as Robert Lucas has pointed out.36  First, the required 
fiscal  policy to restore  expected  equilibrium  is different  in the anticipated 
and unanticipated  cases. Second,  and  perhaps  the greater  danger,  policy- 
makers  may  not perceive  correctly  the magnitude  of the  initial  disturbance 
e when  the response  of the private  economy  has been altered.  Any rule  of 
thumb  that  requires  that a recession  of a certain  size should  be countered 
by a stimulus  of a certain  size  will start  to go wrong. 
It is not absolutely  essential  that  either  side fully understand  the struc- 
ture,  however.  One  could  construct  a model  of adaptive  behavior  in which 
firms  gradually  learn  that cycles are changing,  while policymakers  grad- 
35. If policy were literally as effective as is stated in this model-that  is, if it were 
always set to restore expected equilibrium-firms  would seem to discover that dis- 
turbances  are no longer serially correlated.  In practice, of course, policy never has 
gone this far. The conflicting  goals of controlling inflation and maintaining  full em- 
ployment  have made actual policy more complex. 
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ually  learn  that  the response  of the private  sector  is changing.  Eventually, 
there could be a convergence  to behavioral  and policy rules that look 
rational,  in that  neither  firms  nor policymakers  are consistently  surprised 
by the  reactions  of the others. 
PRICES,  MONEY,  AND  MONETARY  POLICY 
The conclusions  concerning  anticipated  and  unanticipated  fiscal  policy 
carry  over qualitatively  to an economy  with money and with some price 
flexibility.  Also, the same  framework  can  be applied  to analyzing  monetary 
policy, although  the difficulty  of finding  an explicit  solution  for the path 
of the monetary  economy limits the analysis  to a general  discussion  of 
some of the main issues. 
The model  starts  with  an adjustment  equation  for the  price  level,  P: 
(20)  T  _  _  =  (x  -x*) 
where AP equals (P -  P1).  This expression  says that inflation  acceler- 
ates or decelerates  depending  upon  the GNP gap.  Hence a disturbance  to 
aggregate  demand  now causes a price as well as a supply (output) re- 
sponse.  Almost any  reasonable  partial-adjustment  specification  would  do 
as well as equation  20. The main  specification  that  is ruled  out is one with 
AP/P  -  (AP/P)e  on the left-hand  side, which would give, effectively, 
complete  price flexibility. 
To the price  equation  add a simple  equation  relating  the LM curve  and 
money  demand: 
(21)  M=  bxtR-, 
where  M is the nominal  money supply,  b is a coefficient,  R the nominal 
interest  rate on one-period  bonds, ju  the income elasticity  of money  de- 
mand, and 0 the interest  elasticity.  Let re be the expected  real rate of 
interest  in period  t, defined  approximately  by 
(22)  re =  R  -  ) 
Assume now that the model economy described  previously,  with the 
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the nominal  money  supply  grows  at a constant  rate  n. The equilibrium  is 
described  by 
(23)  x  = x*,  c  = c*,i  =i*,  g=g* 
and 
AP/P  =  n, R  =  R*, r* =  R*-n. 
How are the real and monetary  sectors  linked  in the context  of short- 
run fluctuations?  Because  the model has not included  separate  prices  for 
capital  goods and  consumption  goods,  capital  gains  or losses  on the  physi- 
cal capital  stock are ruled out.37  The impact  on consumption  of changes 
in real wealth  through  changes  in the real value of government  financial 
liabilities  is certainly  small.  Movements  of the real  interest  rate  might  thus 
be the main  link  between  the real and  monetary  sectors.  Anything  that  can 
be said about  the response  of the real  interest  rate  to the disturbance  e ap- 
plies  to the earlier  findings. 
RESPONSE  TO  A DEMAND  DISTURBANCE:  NO  OFFSETTING 
POLICY 
Three  forces  influence  the real  interest  rate  following  the  disturbance  e: 
(1)  the change  in output alters  the transaction  demand  for money and 
hence the nominal  interest  rate; (2)  the change  in the price level alters 
real  money  balances,  also changing  the nominal  interest  rate;  and (3) the 
change  in the expected  rate  of inflation  alters  the real rate  of interest,  for 
any  given  nominal  rate. 
The reason the outcome is ambiguous  is because of the third effect, 
which  acquires  special  importance  in models  with  rational  expectations.88 
This  is because,  in such  models,  even  short-run  fluctuations  in the inflation 
rate  will be anticipated. 
37.  This is not to say such changes are unimportant  in practice. Excluding this 
effect is clearly a weakness, but adding another price also greatly complicates the 
specification. 
38. This effect has been known for a long time. Don Patinkin devoted a good 
deal of space to the question in "Price  Flexibility and Full Employment,"  American 
Economic Review, vol.  38  (September 1948),  pp. 543-64.  James Tobin has con- 
sistently emphasized  the issue at least since "Money and Economic Growth,"  Econo- 
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The interaction  among  the three  effects  given above can be described 
by the following.  Equation  21 says  that,  as an approximation, 
(24)  AM  AP  P  pAx -  0 AR 
M  P  -p  x  R 
By assumption  M grows  at a rate n throughout.  Also by assumption  the 
economy  was  in  equilibrium in  period  t -  1  with  APJ/P  l =  n  and 
x = x*. Thus  equation  20 gives 
(25)  AP -  An  Ax 
so that  24 and  25 give 
(26)  i\~~~R  Ax (u+  7  (26)  A  =X(+Y 
The deviation  of actual  inflation  in t from  its equilibrium  rate  n (as given 
by 25) is correctly  anticipated,  so that  equation  22 gives 
(27)  Are  = AR -  y Ax 
x 
which,  with 26, gives 
Ar,!=A  -R  +  Ry-y) 
The three  terms  in the  numerator  of the  parentheses  are  the three  effects 
given above.39  Consider  the following  parameter  estimates: (a)  the in- 
terest  elasticity  of the demand  for money  equals  0.2 and  the income  elas- 
ticity equals 0.7; (b)  a 5 percent  decline  in GNP cuts the inflation  rate 
1 percent (y =  0.2);  (c)  the nominal  interest  rate is 6 percent.  Then 
(0.042 + 0.012 -  0.04),=  0.014 for the value  of the term  in parentheses 
in equation  27. These parameters  imply that the real interest  rate is re- 
duced by 7 basis points for each 1 percent  reduction  in output.40  This 
39. Equation 27 depends upon the nominal interest rate and is, therefore, not 
invariant to the equilibrium growth rate of money, n. The reason for this is that 
equation 20, which is modeled after Phillips-curve  specifications,  gives the absolute 
change in the inflation rate, not, for example, the proportional  change. If 20 is cor- 
rect, then 27 should depend  upon n. 
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is not a terribly  large effect, and so it suggests  that equation  13 was a 
reasonable  first approximation  to the initial response of the economy, 
even with the money-price  side of the picture  included. 
Trying  alternative  values  of y in equation  27 illustrates  that  price  flexi- 
bility hurts  stability  in the first  instance.  If y is zero (no flexibility),  the 
real interest  rate  falls by 21 basis  points  for each 1 percent  fall in output. 
For y > 0.43, movements  in the real  interest  rate  are  destabilizing. 
In the longer run, of course, price flexibility  will have a cumulative 
effect on the price level that is certainly  stabilizing.  As the path of the 
economy  develops  over time, the persistent  deviation  of output  from its 
equilibrium  will result  in a persistent  deviation  of the inflation  rate from 
the growth  rate of the nominal  money supply.  Unless the path of output 
starts  to diverge  unstably,  the cumulative  effect will outweigh  the other 
forces on the real interest  rate. The real interest  rate  will then move fur- 
ther, always  in the same direction  as the disturbance. 
Finally,  price effects  rule out the monotonic  convergence  of the econ- 
omy  to its equilibrium  that  was a feature  of the  previous  analysis.  In order 
to return  to its long-run  equilibrium  the economy  must  restore  the equilib- 
rium  level of the real money  supply.  But since  this has been disturbed  by 
output  movements  on one side of x*, it must  be restored  by output  on the 
other  side of x*. At least  one full cycle  must  follow a demand  disturbance. 
ANTICIPATED  AND  UNANTICIPATED  POLICY 
Suppose  that monetary  rather  than fiscal  policy is used to restore  ex- 
pected equilibrium  in period t +  1 and subsequent  periods.  If the policy 
is not anticipated,  the initial  response  of the economy  is the same  as that 
in the no-policy  case described  above. Thus it is also true for monetary 
policy  that,  when  policy  is anticipated,  the initial  response  of the economy 
is modified  and  is more  stable.  The reasoning  is the same:  investment  does 
not respond  to the  disturbance. 
Furthermore,  like the change  for anticipated  fiscal  policy, and for the 
same  reason,  the needed  change  is larger  for anticipated  monetary  policy. 
This is especially  true  when  prices  adjust.  Since  the response  of the econ- 
omy in period  t was smaller,  the deviation  of the rate  of inflation  from  its 
long-run  value n is also smaller.  Thus the endogenously  stabilizing  ad- 
justment  of real  money  balances  is smaller  as a result  of anticipated  policy 
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Wage  and  Price  Setting  and  Anticipated  Policy 
The preceding  section  simply  assumed  a price  equation  (equation  20) 
without  inquiring  whether  this equation  itself  might  be directly  influenced 
by the existence  of active  policy. 
Some  observers  suggest  that  a growing  awareness  of stabilization  policy 
has caused  the apparent  inflationary  bias that has characterized  the post- 
war economy.4'  The argument  is that  wages  and  prices  are  not restrained 
during a downturn  as they once were, because downturns  are seen as 
temporary.  Firms and workers  know that wage and price increases  will 
be accommodated  by expansion  of the money supply  or fiscal stimulus. 
This argument  suggests  that while stabilization  policy may be able to in- 
fluence  real  output,  nevertheless  it inherently  contains  the seeds  of chronic 
inflation. 
Now perhaps  actual  policy in the postwar  period  has contained  an in- 
flationary  bias, but there  is no inherent  asymmetry  of inflationary  bias in 
stabilization  policy per se. If policymakers  are committed  to maintaining 
a target  level of output,  either  positive or negative  departures  from this 
target  will be offset  by policy action.  Thus while recessions  may become 
less effective  in restraining  inflationary  wage  increases,  so also will booms 
cause  less acceleration  of wage  inflation. 
Several  routes  have  been suggested  for inflationary  bias to get into pol- 
icymaking.  A familiar story concerns the misestimate  of the long-run 
tradeoff  through  ignoring  the built-in  or expected  rate of inflation.  It is 
not clear that such arguments  are correct.  The preoccupation  in the last 
few years with inflation at the expense of unemployment  is evidence 
against  them, while the fiscal and monetary  expansion  of the late 1960s 
(which is the source  of a large part of the inflation  problem) was moti- 
vated substantially  by noneconomic  factors.  But whether  correct  or not, 
the arguments  do not undermine  the analytical  foundations  of stabilization 
policy. 
In fact, there  is an argument  that stabilization  policy lends a helping 
hand in allowing  the economy  to operate  at a lower average  rate of un- 
employment  without  accelerating  inflation.  The  price-adjustment  equation 
41.  For example, Fellner, Towards a Reconstruction of Macroeconomics, dis- 
cusses this view, and Fellner's thinking on this point has been expressed in earlier 
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used earlier, equation  20, was linear in the GNP gap. But there is a 
widely  held  view  that  the relation  between  inflation  and  excess  demand  or 
supply  is convex  from  below. Conventional  Phillips  curves  are estimated 
with  the reciprocal  of the unemployment  rate (u) as the cyclical  variable. 
Take  the  following: 
(28)  AP  I  I  P- 
(28)~  ~  ~  i  p  y (u  u*)  +  P1 
To avoid  accelerating  inflation  the following  condition  is required: 
(29)  E  I1-  1  = O. 
With  no fluctuations  at all, the economy  can operate  at a nonacceler- 
ating-inflation  rate of unemployment  (NAIRU), or natural  rate, of uO. 
If u varies  over  time,  the condition  implies 
(30)  E(u) >?"u*, 
and 
E(u) -tl u* 
=(coefficient  of variation of u)2. 
Thus  the extent  to which  the average  unemployment  rate  must  exceed  the 
nonstochastic  NAIRU depends  upon the variability  of the economy-a 
simple  consequence  of the convexity  of the Phillips  curve.  A reduction  in 
the variance  of unemployment  over time is like a reduction  in unemploy- 
ment dispersion  across  labor  markets  at a moment  in time.  If the current 
or recent unemployment  rate is no longer an adequate  variable  in the 
Phillips  curve,  the story  will have to be changed.  But the same  basic idea 
will hold if there is a convex relation  between  the inflation  rate and the 
appropriate  cyclical  variable. 
Conclusion 
Two main strands  run through  recent thinking  concerning  the inter- 
actions  between  stabilization  policy and private  economic  behavior.  The 
first  is that private  economic  behavior  will be altered  by the existence  of 
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ticipated.  This paper  has offered  support  for the first  of these ideas and 
has disagreed  with  the second. 
Any individual  piece of the empirical  evidence  in itself would  not con- 
vincingly  demonstrate  policy-induced  changes in private economic be- 
havior;  but the cumulative  effect of the equations  is suggestive.  Perhaps 
the findings  for employment  are the most striking.  Whatever  the cause  of 
the shifting  responses,  the results do show that cyclical patterns  have 
changed  since World  War  II in ways  that  require  some explanation. 
The inferences  that should  be drawn  from this paper are limited  and 
should  be handled  with  care.  The results  generally  indicate  that  the short- 
run response  of the economy  has become more stable. But only a very 
few sectors  were considered  and structural  changes  elsewhere  may have 
offset any policy-induced  increase  in endogenous  stability.  For example, 
purchases  of consumer  durables  are now a much larger  fraction  of con- 
sumer  expenditure  and the behavior  of consumer  demand  for durables  is 
quite volatile. The United States is now more influenced  by the world 
economy  and  this  change  has affected  stability. 
The theoretical  analysis  was intended  to illustrate  a certain  viewpoint, 
not provide a comprehensive  model. Keynesian  business-cycle  models 
have often specified  rather  naive  behavioral  relations  so that  a model  with 
foresight  or rational  expectations  may  provide  a useful  counterpoint. 
The model may offer a new perspective  in still another  way. Simple 
models  often require  choosing  either  to focus on income  and expenditure 
and view a recession  as a deficiency  of real aggregate  demand,  or to focus 
on money and the price level and view a recession  as a divergence  be- 
tween the actual and the equilibrium  price level. Obviously,  a synthesis 
of the two is better  than  either  one separately.  But the first  approach  does 
seem  to lead to a different  view of anticipated  policy and  its effectiveness. 
APPENDIX 
Solving  for the  Effects  of Random  Shocks 
CONSUMPTION  c is given by 
(A-1)  c  =  03XY* +  (1  -  X)Y]  +  e Martin Neil Baily  49 
But y*  =  x*-g*  and y  =  x  -  g* when government expenditure is 
assumed  constant.  Thus x is given  by 
(A-2)  x  =  3[Xx*  +  (1 -  X)x] +  (1 -  3)g* +  e  +  vxe-  v(l  -)x*. 
Solving  for x requires  knowing  the expected  value of output in period 
t +  1-namely xe . This value influences  the desired  capital  stock and 
hence  investment.  Based  on what  is known  in t, 
(A-3)  4Xe  i[Xx* +  (1 -  j)41]  +  (1 -  3)g* 
+  e1  +  VX  V(1  -)X 
Thus  xl  depends  upon  x+  and  similarly  x+2 depends  upon  X3,  and  so on. 
As a first  approximation,  assume  that for some large  T, Xe+1  =  x*  and 
,e+i  =  0 (subsequently  T will go to infinity).  This gives 
(A-4)  Xs  =4  XX*  +  (1  -X)Xe  +  (1 
_ 
)g*  + 
e 
+  VX* 
_ 
v(1  -  3)Xe 
and hence 
(A-5)  xe4[  + v(l  -_  ) -3(l  -  X)J  =  (1  _  3)g* +  XX*  +  e +  VX*; 
that is, 
b  1 
XT  =  +  a 4  +  -  X 
where b and a are defined from equation A-5. 
For the previous  period 
(A-6)  XT1  =  #[XX*  +  (1  -  X)Xe1] 
+  (1  -)g*  +  e..1  +  VX  -  V(1 -)X 
that is, 
=  -+  ~~E~1  +  +4  T  a  +  a  er_1  +-aXT  =Ia  (  +  V  +  (v  (1+  2V  a  a  a  a  a  a  a, 
where equation A-5 has been substituted and the property that 4-eTp 
has been used.  By extension, 
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Then,  if  v/a  <  1, letT  T->  ,  T-+  o,  and  T-  =  ito  give 
(A-8)  b  ____ 
a-v  a-pv 
Then 
b  _  (1-)g*  +  fXX*  x* 
a-v  1-va-f3(1-  X) 
from A-5, and a -  pv =  1 +  v(l  -  a-  p) -  ,B(  -  X). These values then 
yield the expression  given  in the text. The condition  v/a  <  1 implies 
(A-9)  v < 1  + v(l  -  ) -(1  -X) 
that is, p(1 -  X) +  va <  1. This is weaker  than the already  assumed 
condition  A +  vW  <  1. Comments  and 
Discussion 
Edmund  S. Phelps:  If a student  asked  me for a sample  of good work by 
the best practitioners  of macroeconomics  I would hand over a copy of 
Martin  Neil Baily's  paper.  I should  think  that  its knowledgeable  examina- 
tion of wide-ranging  data and its insightful  analysis  of an ingenious  dy- 
namic  model  would  make  a very  good  impression. 
The theoretical  portion  of the paper aims to do for balanced-budget 
fiscal  policy  what  the Phelps-Taylor  paper  did for monetary  policy. Baily 
argues  that  rational  expectations  in the sense  of Muth,  Lucas,  Sargent,  and 
others  is no bar to the stabilizing  power  of fiscal  policy if we are realistic 
enough  to hypothesize  a certain  kind of price or wage stickiness-as dis- 
tinct from indefinite  price-wage  fixity. In this restoration  Baily succeeds 
brilliantly,  maybe  misleadingly  well. 
Being  a captious  pedant,  I would  probably  warn  my student  not to take 
Baily's  modeling  of investment  behavior  entirely  literally,  adding  that it 
may make some sense if we think of working  capital  like machine  tools 
and  unfinished  inventories.  I would  also complain  that (as an approxima- 
tion, at any  rate) Baily's  inflation  equation  is derivable  from  a model  with 
overlapping  wage (or price) commitments  and that, accordingly,  the size 
of the parameter  y will depend  on, among  other  things,  the stabilization 
rule adopted  by the fiscal authorities.  But, as already  implied, I would 
leave the student  with no doubt as to my admiration  for Baily's  analysis 
and  clear  exposition. 
Still, I am afraid  that my student,  if a skeptical  college senior,  would 
return  with  some  searching  questions.  Where  did  Baily  get the presupposi- 
tion that macropolicy,  either  fiscal or monetary,  stabilizes  any better  in 
thepost-Keynes  years  than  it did in the  bad old days  from  1900 (or 1914) 
to 1945? Was it true,  for example,  that when the country  entered  World 
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War  I the government  was less ready  to cut back civilian  government  ex- 
penditures  and  to step  up tax rates  than  it was when  we entered  Vietnam? 
I would  have  to say  that  I don't  know;  the student  has a point. 
Thus encouraged,  the student  might  also venture  that Baily gives too 
rosy and undifferentiated  a picture of the stabilizing  capacities  of bal- 
anced-budget  fiscal policy-in  a monetarist  milieu, at any rate. Can we 
really  rescue  the economy  from disturbances  like the oil shock or some 
sag in the profitability  of investment?  Within  a year or two? And if em- 
ployment  can eventually  be propped  up again,  might  not the fiscal  medi- 
cine gradually  lose its effectiveness,  and even aggravate  the patient's  con- 
dition  in the long  run? 
These worries  are very much in the air these days. Some recent  work 
of my own (on a two-country  model of dynamic  equilibrium)  shows  that 
a balanced-budget  fiscal stimulus,  though  it will increase  employment  in 
the short  run, may well leave employment  lower in the long run than it 
would  have  been without  that  stimulus.  By slowing  capital  formation  and 
real-wage  growth,  the stimulus  drives  up the price level and erodes the 
real value of cash balances;  a net tendency toward  lower employment 
seems  to be a possible  outcome.  In that case, if money  wages  do not per- 
form  the necessary  downward  adjustment,  owing  perhaps  to the expecta- 
tion of a continuing  full-employment  policy,  monetary  policy  becomes  the 
only  remaining  remedy. 
My reaction,  then,  is that  Baily has made a good case for keeping  bal- 
anced-budget  expenditure  policy in the kit of anticyclical  tools, at least 
in a monetarist  world.  But I suspect  that by focusing  on disturbances  to 
consumer  demand,  where  such fiscal policy is at its greatest  advantage, 
Baily  may  have  strengthened  what  are  quite  possibly  false hopes  about  the 
general  utility  of the  balanced-budget  instrument. 
Benjamin  M. Friedman:  Martin  Baily's interesting  paper adds, at both 
the empirical  and the analytical  levels, to our efforts  to understand  the 
difficult  subject  of the effects  of stabilization  policy in a world in which 
economic  behavior  depends  fundamentally  upon expectations  about  eco- 
nomic  behavior.  At the empirical  level Baily offers  evidence  that, during 
the postwar  period,  businessmen  and investors  have changed  the way in 
which they form expectations  from observing  economic developments; 
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governument  policy in maintaining  economic stability.  At the analytical 
level, Baily offers  a framework  in which correct,  or "rational,"  expecta- 
tions of monetary  and fiscal policy not only do not nullify  the intended 
influence  of these policies (as is the case in some models) but even rein- 
force  their  effect  on the economy's  stability. 
I will focus first  on the overall  subject  of expectations  and the efficacy 
of policy,  and  comment  briefly  on the nature  of Baily's  analytical  model.  I 
will then  turn  to his empirical  work,  and  comment  on the inferences  to be 
drawn  about  these  current  controversies  over  the macroeconomic  implica- 
tions  of expectations. 
Although  Baily motivates  this  work  by referring  to the recent  literature 
of "rational"  expectations,  there are in fact two competing  expectations 
hypotheses  in his paper.  I think  the distinction  between  them  is even  more 
important  than his paper suggests. Both hypotheses imply a growing 
awareness  of government  policy and  its effects  on the part  of private  eco- 
nomic decisionmakers,  as is consistent  with their  observing  and learning 
from the pattern of developments  in monetary  and fiscal policy since 
World  War II. Beyond that similarity,  however,  the two hypotheses  di- 
verge  sharply.  In particular,  they have  precisely  opposite  implications  for 
the effectiveness  of economic  stabilization  policy. 
The first  hypothesis  is the familiar  recent  "rational  expectations"  view: 
here,  as a consequence  of certain  specifications  of economic  behavior,  the 
power  of monetary  policy to influence  real variables  depends  crucially  on 
the ability  to surprise  private  decisionmakers,  and  monetary  policy  actions 
that are anticipated  have no real consequences. (Oddly enough, the 
popular  conception  of this  literature  credits  fiscal  policy,  too, with  efficacy- 
only-by-surprise,  although,  as Ray Fair has recently  reminded  us, there 
is no persuasive  theoretical  case for doing so.) According  to this hypoth- 
esis, the postwar  period  of activist  stabilization  policy should  have  fooled 
people  at first.  As they learned  about  the new policy approaches  and  how 
they worked,  however,  they should  then have changed  their  behavior  in 
ways  that  would  have offset the stabilizing  influence  of these  policies. 
Following Baily's analogy, we may call the second hypothesis  the 
"FDIC  effect":  here the public's  knowledge  of the presence  of stabilizing 
monetary  and  fiscal  policy  leads  to expectations  of a more  stable  economic 
environment,  and these expectations  in turn lead to stability-enhancing 
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tive hypothesis  is that,  as people  learned  about  the postwar  activist  stabili- 
zation  policy,  they  should  have  changed  their  behavior  in ways  that  would 
have  promoted  stability. 
Two aspects  of the analytical  approach  to these  issues  merit  comment. 
The first  is the curious  current  vocabulary  of this subject,  according  to 
which  the first  hypothesis  asserts  that  people  form  their  expectations  "ra- 
tionally"  while the second hypothesis,  by process  of elimination,  asserts 
the formation  of "irrational"  expectations.  Indeed,  some contributors  to 
the recent  "rational  expectations"  literature-for example,  Robert  Lucas 
in a recent reply in the American Economic Review-have  actually used 
the word "irrational"  to refer  to the class of hypotheses  consisting  of all 
alternatives  to the idea that people form expectations  "rationally"  in the 
sense  of John  Muth's  now  famous  Econometrica  paper. 
This usage  is unfortunate  because  Muth's  conception  of "rational"  ex- 
pectations includes not just the presumably  unobjectionable  idea that 
people fully exploit whatever  information  they have but also a more de- 
batable-and,  in principle,  empirically  testable-assumption about  how 
complete  that information  is. In particular,  according  to Muth's  notion 
of "rational"  expectations  as applied  in the recent  literature,  people's  sub- 
jective  expectations  of outcomes  are  identical  to the corresponding  objec- 
tive expectations  conditional  on the process  generating  those outcomes. 
In other  words,  Muth's  idea is that  people  form  their  expectations  "as  if" 
they know the "true"  model of the economy.  To label as "irrationality" 
the alternative  notion that people exploit fully all the information  that 
they have, but nevertheless  do not know the "true"  model, seems  highly 
misleading. 
The second aspect  of "rational  expectations"  models deserves  special 
attention  in the context of Baily's competing  "FDIC"  hypothesis.  The 
method of solution  of "rational  expectations"  models always  requires  a 
terminal  condition  that,  in effect,  rules out self-fulfilling  expectations.  In 
other words, all such models presume  a condition  that guarantees  that 
there exists only one set of expectations  that can be self-fulfilling  in a 
stable  equilibrium.  Simply  thinking  in a different  way,  with  no independent 
basis  for it in fact, does not make  new  things  happen.  In "rational  expecta- 
tions" models in which monetary  policy is neutral,  therefore,  changing 
the policy cannot  change  the one solution  of the model that  is consistent 
with self-fulfilling  expectations.  Robert  Shiller  has called attention  to the 
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than its usual offhand  treatment  suggests;  and John Taylor and Olivier 
Blanchard  have also questioned  the conditions  required  for a unique  "ra- 
tional  expectations"  equilibrium. 
The relevance  of this point here is that Baily's "FDIC"  hypothesis 
seems to suggest that more than one set of expectations  can be self- 
fulfilling. This idea per se is  not new. Milton Friedman and Anna 
Schwartz,  among  many  others,  suggested  it with respect  to deposit  insur- 
ance  itself  years  ago. In that  application,  however,  there  is no explicit  con- 
flict  with  the usual  requirements  of a "rational  expectations"  model,  since 
bank failure (the excluded possibility) does not constitute a stable- 
equilibrium  outcome.  The application  of this idea to macroeconomic  sta- 
bilization  policy-which  Keynes  suggested  in his remarks  in the General 
Theory on the "state  of long-term  expectations"-seems again  to suggest 
multiple  stable  paths  to go along  with  different  policies.  There  is a contrast 
here,  however.  Unlike  the original  FDIC example,  Baily's  model  does  use 
the familiar  terminal  condition  and therefore  does have a unique  stable- 
equilibrium  solution corresponding  to each policy. Nevertheless,  since 
Baily's  model does not have some of the special  elements  that  make  mon- 
etary  policy neutral  under  "rational"  expectations-in particular,  Robert 
Lucas'  only-surprises-matter  aggregate  supply  function-solutions corre- 
sponding  to different  policies  are  different.  The source  of their  differences, 
however,  is the nonneutrality  of the underlying  model, and not simply 
self-fulfilling  expectations. 
Baily's  empirical  work  demonstrates  changes  since 1948 in the employ- 
ment, inventory,  and investment  responses  by firms  to observed  fluctua- 
tions in output.  These responses  presumably  depend,  at least in part,  on 
how firms  use observed  output  to forecast  future  output.  Baily interprets 
his results  as showing  that these responses  have changed  in the direction 
consistent  with  the "FDIC"  hypothesis  and  inconsistent  with  the "rational 
expectations"  hypothesis.  For example,  the employment  response  of the 
private  nonfarm  economy  to a sustained  1 percent  movement  in output 
has fallen from 1 percent  on employment  for 1 percent  on output  in the 
1948-61 period  to only 0.7 percent  or 0.8 percent  for 1 percent  more  re- 
cently.  Baily  notes  the stabilizing  implications  of these  results,  interpreting 
them  without  reference  to any excluded  variables,  but then suggests  that 
the less-than-proportional  response  to the distributed  lag on past output 
in the later periods  means that people are now using information  other 
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put-thereby implicitly  suggesting  that  other  relevant  variables  have  been 
excluded  from the regressions.  This interpretation  somewhat  clouds the 
implications  of the results,  however,  since  the omitted  variables  could  be 
concealing  additional  signs  of instability. 
I want  to suggest  an alternative  interpretation  of Baily's  employment- 
response  results  that sharpens  their  implications  supporting  the "FDIC" 
hypothesis  and  controverting  the "rational  expectations"  hypothesis.  Here 
I refer  first  to the results  in his table 2. These regressions  relate  the log- 
arithm  of employment  to a constant,  a time trend,  and a distributed  lag 
on the logarithm  of output.  It is easiest  to conceptualize  these expressions 
as equating  the logarithm  of employment  to the logarithm  of expected 
output  plus the logarithm  of the desired  labor-output  ratio.  The constant 
term and time trend  on the right-hand  side together  serve  two purposes, 
not only enabling  the desired  labor-output  ratio to decline  exponentially 
but also permitting  the inclusion  of an exponential  growth  trend  in the 
underlying  expectation  of output. 
The approximately  unit sum for the lag weights  in the distributed  lag 
on output in the regression  for 1948-61 indicates  that, apart  from the 
time trend, people forecast output as a process that was borderline 
stationary-nonstationary.  In other words, any deviation  of output  from 
trend,  once maintained  for the five-quarter  length  of the distributed  lag, 
was expected to persist indefinitely.  An alternative  rendering  in log- 
arithmic  first-difference  terms,  which  allows  for the serial-correlation  cor- 
rection  also being approximately  unity,  implies  that any real growth  rate 
that  persisted  for five  quarters  became  the growth  rate  people  expected  for 
the future.  This willingness  to accept  any recent  real  growth  experience  as 
indicative  of prospects  suggests  that people had little confidence  in the 
ability  or  willingness  of policy  to guide  the economy. 
By contrast,  in each of the regressions  for later  time  periods  the sum  of 
the weights  in the distributed  lag on output  is well below  unity.  Instead  of 
either  Baily's  suggested  interpretation  that  other  variables  (excluded  from 
the equation)  determined  the expectations  of output,  or Baily's  noted  but 
rejected  interpretation  of a less-than-proportional  short-run  adjustment  of 
employment  to expected  output,  I suggest  the following:  Firms  continued 
to adjust  employment  approximately  in proportion  with  expected  output, 
and  they  continued  to form  their  expectations  of output  growth  by looking 
at recent output fluctuations.  Instead of assuming  that output growth 
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growth  as a stationary  process-that is, as a process  that  returns  over  time 
to a normal  level, in this case a positive  level promoted  by policy. One 
characteristic  of a stationary  autoregressive  process  is that  the lag weights 
sum  to less than  unity,  and  Baily's  three  employment-response  regressions 
for later  time periods  all have lag-weight  sums that are significantly  less 
than  unity  at the 1 percent  level. 
A second distinction  between stationary  and borderline  stationary- 
nonstationary  forecasting  schemes  can serve  as a check  on this  interpreta- 
tion. Whereas  a stationary-nonstationary  process  in this context  usually 
has  no constant  term,  a strictly  stationary  process  does have  a constant;  in 
the case of real growth,  that  constant  is again  presumably  positive.  Hence 
the switch  from a borderline  stationary-nonstationary  forecasting  scheme 
for output  in the early  years  to a stationary  scheme  later  on should  imply 
not only a fall to below  unity  for the sum  of the equation's  distributed-lag 
weights  but also an increase  for the equation's  intercept,  which now in- 
corporates  two time trends and the constant element of the output- 
expectations  process.  Baily's table 2 shows that in the three regressions 
for later periods  the intercept  is indeed  greater  (apparently  significantly 
so) than  in the 1948-61 regression. 
Baily's employment-response  results based on monthly data for the 
manufacturing  sector, shown  in his table 3, are also consistent  with the 
same  interpretation  that  sharpens  their  support  of the "FDIC"  hypothesis. 
The sum  of the distributed-lag  weights  is again  close to unity  in the regres- 
sion for 1949-61 but significantly  less than  unity  at the 1 percent  level in 
each of the three regressions  for later time periods,  and the intercept  in 
two of these three  regressions  appears  to be significantly  greater  than  that 
in the 1949-61 regression. 
General  Discussion 
Several  of the discussants  pointed  out that  Baily's  hypothesis  that  gov- 
ernment  policy had changed  behavior  in the private  sector  was not the 
only explanation  consistent with the statistical  evidence of structural 
change  in private-sector  responses  that he had presented.  R. A. Gordon 
mentioned  several  competing  hypotheses  to explain  smaller  fluctuations 
in output  and  employment:  the increased  share  of services  in total  output, 
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of overhead  labor, and the spread  of scientific  techniques  for inventory 
management.  Charles  Holt pointed out that inventory  and employment 
decisions  are commonly  made  by lower-level  employees  who are  unlikely 
to be responsive  to changes  in government  policy or even  to national  eco- 
nomic developments.  They are responsive,  instead, to company data, 
which  suggests  that  structural  changes  may  have arisen  from  the develop- 
ment of operations  research  and computers  rather  than from improved 
government  policymaking. 
Holt also noted that higher  costs of employment  fluctuations,  such as 
supplementary  unemployment  benefits  offered  by some firms,  could also 
help explain  reduced  volatility  in output  and employment.  John  Kareken 
warned,  however,  that such institutional  changes  could have been made 
precisely  because  fluctuations  were expected  to be smaller,  thus making 
them  an effect  rather  than  a cause  of reduced  volatility.  Christopher  Sims 
pointed  out that the growing  relative  size of the government  sector  could 
contribute  to greater  stability  in private  output  even  if stabilization  policy 
itself were not conducted more successfully.  Saul Hymans supported 
Baily's interpretation,  noting that although  the statistical  results them- 
selves might  be consistent  with numerous  hypotheses,  he was convinced 
by Baily's integration  of the statistical  evidence  with his analysis  of the 
institutional  environment. 
Robert  Hall and George  von Furstenberg  questioned  whether  govern- 
ment  policy had in fact become  increasingly  stabilizing  over the postwar 
period.  Hall said  that a cursory  glance  at the data  on the money  stock  and 
real government  expenditure  did not support  this proposition  and von 
Furstenberg  cited  studies  by Friedlaender  and  by Blinder  and  Goldfeld  in 
which the lagged effects of fiscal policy had been found to be random. 
However,  George  Perry  noted, around  recessions,  neither  fiscal  nor mon- 
etary  policy had been random.  Except in the post-Korean  reconversion 
quarters,  both types  of policy turned  expansionary  by the time of cyclical 
troughs,  which  was  precisely  the  behavior  that  would  allay  fears  of a down- 
ward spiral in the economy. Baily then pointed out that there was no 
claim that stabilization  policy increased  uniformly  in effectiveness  over 
the  postwar  period.  The  main  hypothesis  relevant  to the empirical  analysis 
was that, by comparison  with the years up to 1946, postwar  business 
cycles  were  moderated  and output  was kept fairly  close to potential  out- 
put.  This change  was not anticipated,  but was  learned  through  the experi- 
ence  of a few postwar  fluctuations.  The general  climate  of opinion  attrib- Martin  Neil Baily  59 
uted the change  in part to the combined  effects of monetary  and fiscal 
policy.  The  discussion  turned  to whether  Baily's  analysis  depended  on sta- 
bilization  policy having  become more successful.  Holt supported  Baily's 
general  contention  that,  in principle,  it did  not: if postwar  economics  text- 
books  and  the writings  of journalists  had  taught  that  fiscal  policy stabilizes 
the  economy,  people's  behavior  could  change  regardless  of whether  policy, 
in practice,  succeeded. 
Hall and Sims  suggested  that  Baily examine  the stochastic  behavior  of 
output.  In particular,  for Baily's interpretation  of the period, if policy- 
makers  reduced  the variance  of output,  he should  expect  to find  that the 
serial correlation  of output was reduced-the  path of output was less 
smooth.  It is as a consequence  of this lower serial  correlation  that Baily 
should expect private  decisionmakers  to respond  less than before  to ob- 
served  shocks  in output.  Sims  noted  further  that  an alternative  adjustment 
could take place: if policymakers  tried to smooth output rather  than 
merely  reduce  its variance,  private  decisionmakers  would be induced  to 
respond  more rather  than less, knowing  that shocks  would persist  more. 